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DOES LAND ABUNDANCE EXPLAIN AFRICAN INSTITUTIONS?
JAMES FENSKE†
ABSTRACT. The land abundance view of African history uses factor endowments to ex-
plain patterns of land rights and slavery before colonial rule. Population density and
institutional outcomes have, however, been jointly shaped by the same geographic forc-
ing variables. In a cross section of global societies, I find that historic land rights, slavery,
and population density are each predicted by environmental features such as land qual-
ity and terrain ruggedness. I discuss whether these patterns support particular theories
of land rights and slavery, and whether there is evidence for institutional persistence in
the present.
This version: July 3, 2012
1. INTRODUCTION
In contrast to Europe and Asia, Africa was less densely populated at the beginning of
the twentieth century (Herbst, 2000, p. 16). By then, slavery was widespread in Africa
(Lovejoy, 2000). Land tenure on much of the continent was, and still is, characterized
by group rights and overlapping claims (Bruce et al., 1994). The “land abundance” view
of African history connects these facts (Austin, 2008a; Hopkins, 1973; Iliffe, 1995). From
this perspective, since land was not scarce, it had no price, and rights over it were ill-
defined. Because independent farmers could not be persuaded to become hired work-
ers, coerced and household labor substituted for wage employment. In this paper, I
use cross-sectional data on a sample of global societies to uncover the geographic forc-
ing variables that have jointly determined historical land rights, slavery, and population
density. Though this exercise is ultimately descriptive, it sheds light on whether existing
theories of land rights and slavery, including the land abundance view, fit the facts.
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I take data on institutions from the cross-section of global societies included in Mur-
dock’s (1967) Ethnographic Atlas. Combining maps of these societies with multiple
sources of spatial data, I examine whether geographic features can predict the patterns
of land rights, slavery, and population density in this sample. To test for the persis-
tent effects of these institutions in the present in Africa and Asia, I aggregate them to
the country level using ethnic populations reported in the Soviet Atlas Narodov Mira
(1964). Within sub-Saharan Africa, I test whether historical institutions predict the own-
ership of durable goods and levels of education in the present using data from the De-
mographic and Health Surveys (DHS).
I find that that ethnic groups are more likely to possess rights over land if land quality
is better, they are observed later, precipitation is lower, malaria is more prevalent, terrain
is more rugged, and if they are further from the equator. Slavery is more common in hot-
ter environments, in societies that are observed earlier, where malaria is more prevalent,
terrain is more rugged, further from the equator, and in locations with greater access to
major rivers. Historical populations have been densest in areas of better land quality,
lower precipitation, where societies are observed later, where malaria is most prevalent,
where terrain is more rugged, and closer to the equator. Many of these patterns are
similar when estimated solely on the sample of sub-Saharan ethnic groups.
Many of these results, however, are not robust to the inclusion of fixed effects for ma-
jor ethnographic regions, which roughly approximate continents. The correlations of
land rights with malaria and distance from the equator survive. The negative relation-
ship between temperature and land rights becomes statistically robust. The correla-
tions between slavery and temperature, date of observation, malaria, ruggedness, and
distance from the equator also hold within these broad regions. The associations be-
tween population density, land quality, and distance from the equator remain robust
within continents. The negative correlations of population density with elevation, dis-
tance from the coast, and ecological risk become statistically robust, as does the positive
association between population density and access to a major river.
These results are consistent with models of land rights and slavery in which insti-
tutions evolve over time alongside population density. Rights exist over land where it
is more scarce and more valuable, though there is only mixed evidence that access to
trade was a determining factor. Slavery too evolves with time alongside population.
Influential theories have used labor scarcity, workers’ outside options, and the relative
productivity of slaves in certain tasks to explain the institution. The results here do not
offer unqualified support for any particular view.
The fraction of a nation’s population that practiced slavery in the past negatively pre-
dicts GDP per capita across African countries today, but no similar relationship is visi-
ble for Asia. In DHS data, women from sub-Saharan ethnic groups that possessed rights
over land own more durable goods today. Greater historical slavery predicts lower levels
of education in the present, but not within countries.
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I contribute to our understanding of historical institutions and to the role of geogra-
phy in shaping them. Land tenure and slavery matter in the present. Rights over land
shape investment incentives (Goldstein and Udry, 2008), labor-supply (Field, 2007), and
violence (Andre and Platteau, 1998). Nunn (2008a) shows that those African countries
that exported the most slaves are comparatively poor today. These effects are not lim-
ited to Africa. Within the Americas, legacies of slavery explain differences in income
across countries and U.S. counties (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997; Nunn, 2008b), as well
as long term racial gaps in education and income (Miller, 2011; Sacerdote, 2005).
Other historical “ethnic” institutions also matter today. Pre-colonial states predict
economic activity (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2010), provision of public goods
(Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007), and governance (Acemoglu et al., 2002a). The existence
of polygamy reduces the incentives to invest in capital (Tertilt, 2005). Local institutions
such as land rights and polygamy have been resilient to national policies (Bubb, 2009;
Fenske, 2012a). As little is known about the origins of institutions that have not been
established by Europeans, I add to our knowledge of the evolution of institutions.
Bio-geographic features such as continental orientation (Diamond, 1997), domestica-
ble species (Olsson and Hibbs, 2005), population (Acemoglu et al., 2002b), settler mor-
tality (Acemoglu et al., 2001), ruggedness (Nunn and Puga, 2012) and crop suitability
(Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997) predict contemporary institutional differences across
countries (Easterly and Levine, 2003). Though the existing literature has focused largely
on the effect of geography on institutions created by Europeans, there are exceptions.
Michalopoulos et al. (2010) and Michalopoulos (2011) link heterogeneity in land quality
to both ethnic fragmentation and the spread of Islam. I continue this line of research by
testing the geographic features that predict land rights, slavery, and population density
across ethnic groups.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I describe my sources of
data and the econometric specifications that I use. In Section 3, I report my results and
discuss their robustness, though detailed robustness checks are confined to the web ap-
pendix. I also test whether these institutions predict contemporary income differences.
In Section 4, I discuss the theories of land rights and slavery that are consistent with
these results, including the “land abundance” view. In Section 5, I conclude.
2. SPECIFICATIONS AND DATA
2.1. Specifications. My base sample is a cross section of 1,205 pre-industrial societies
from around the world. I investigate the geographic determinants of land rights, slavery,
and historic population density by estimating:
yij = x
′
ijβ + δj + ij,(1)
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where yij is an outcome of interest for society i in ethnographic region j. In practice,
this will be an indicator for the presence of land rights, an indicator for the presence of
slavery, or the natural log of historic population density. xij is a vector of geographical
controls that describe the society’s historic territory. These controls will include land
quality, date of observation, average annual precipitation, temperature, absolute lati-
tude, the share of area in which malaria is prevalent, distance from the coast, elevation,
presence of a major river, ruggedness, the share of area that is desert, and the coefficient
of variation of rainfall over time. δj is a fixed effect for the major ethnographic regions:
Africa (the omitted category), the circum-Mediterranean, East Eurasia (which includes
the Indian subcontinent), the Insular Pacific, North America, and South America. i is
random error.
Where the outcome yij is binary, I estimate (1) using a logit. Where yij is continuous, I
use ordinary least squares (OLS). I correct standard errors for spatial dependence using
the method outlined by Conley (1999).1 I allow spatial dependence up to a distance of
ten decimal degrees. For each outcome of interest, I estimate (1) on the full sample with
and without the fixed effects δj . I also estimate (1) on a “sub-Saharan Africa” sample
that includes Ethiopia and the Horn and the Moslem Sudan, regions that my data source
codes as Circum-Mediterranean. In the remainder of this section, I discuss my sources
of data. Details of all variables and their sources are in the web appendix.
2.2. Data on institutions. Data on institutions are taken from Murdock’s (1967) Ethno-
graphic Atlas. This is a database of 1,267 societies from around the world. It contains
categorical variables describing several institutional and cultural features of these soci-
eties, usually at the time of first description by Europeans. From this sample, I remove
2 duplicate observations (the Chilcotin and Tokelau), 8 societies observed before 1500
(Ancient Egypt, Aryans, Babylonia, Romans, Icelander, Uzbeg, Khmer, Hebrews), and 52
for which land quality information is missing (mostly small Pacific islands). This leaves
a base sample of 1,205 societies. 801 of these have data on land rights, 1,040 on slavery.
I construct binary variables for whether land rights or slavery exist. Summary statis-
tics are given in Table 1. For each society, I observe land rights and slavery at the same
point in time. I map slavery in Figure 1. Why use this data? The principal justification
is availability. This is the only source of cross-cultural information on land rights and
slavery that has global scope. The only other alternative, the Standard Cross-Cultural
Sample of Murdock and White (1969), is a derivative of the Ethnographic Atlas. In addi-
tion, the variables were compiled by the same author, and so are internally consistent.
The greatest concern with these data is that they may be anachronistic. They are in-
tended to cover societies at an idealized, timeless and synchronic moment of first Euro-
pean description. In practice, however, many of the observations are constructed from
the works of colonial anthropologists. It is clear from Figure 1, however, that most of
the observations are intended to be uncontaminated by colonial rule. While colonial
1In particular, I use the commands xgmlt and x ols that are posted on his website.
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governments generally abolished slavery sooner or later, what is coded in the data is
what anthropologists recorded as a society’s “historical” institutions; there is still much
slavery in Africa according to the Ethnographic Atlas. In so far as the date at which a
society is observed is a proxy for colonial effects and the severity of measurement error,
I control for it in the econometric analysis. The Atlantic slave trade, by contrast, does
pre-date the observations of the African societies in these data. I discuss this possible
contamination in Section 3.2.
The use of Murdock’s (1967) data is not unique to this paper. Baker and Jacobsen
(2007b) use descriptive statistics from the Ethnographic Atlas to motivate a model of
the gender division of labor. Gennaioli and Rainer (2007) have aggregated its data on
state centralization to the country level using ethnic population numbers from the Atlas
Narodov Mira (1964) in order to show that African countries with stronger pre-colonial
states provide more public goods today. Bezemer et al. (2009) have performed a similar
exercise, showing that the historical prevalence of slavery across African societies pre-
dicts lower incomes in the present. I extend these results in the present paper, showing
that similar effects are not present in Asia, that historical polygamy also predicts worse
outcomes in present-day Africa, and that historical institutions predict durable goods
ownership and educational outcomes at the individual level within sub-Saharan Africa.
Work also exists that attempts to explain variables recorded in ethnographic sources.
Whatley and Gillezeau (2011) show that coastal regions in Africa hit hardest by the slave
trade are more ethnically fragmented in the present, using a map of ethnic groups from
Murdock (1959). Whatley (2012) shows that these same regions have more absolutist
political structures, as recorded in the Ethnographic Atlas. Murdock and White (1969)
created the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample as a spin-off from the Ethnographic Atlas,
containing a larger number of variables for a smaller sample of societies. Matthew Baker
has used this and other ethnographic sources to validate models of the transition to
agriculture (Baker, 2008), hunter-gatherer territoriality (Baker, 2003), land inheritance
rules (Baker and Miceli, 2005), and post-marital residence patterns (Baker and Jacobsen,
2007a).
More recent treatments have combined the Ethnographic Atlas with spatial data on
geographic characteristics. Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2010), for example, show
that economic activity measured using nighttime lights is greater in parts of Africa with
more centralized states before colonial rule. Excluding other work of my own (Fenske,
2012b), the only other paper of which I am aware that has used geographic data to pre-
dict outcomes recorded in the Ethnographic Atlas is Alesina et al. (2011). They use the
suitability of an ethnic group’s territory for plough-intensive crops to predict the his-
toric gender division of labor in agriculture, which in turn explains female labor force
participation rates today.
2.3. Population density. In order to construct population density estimates for these
societies, I first match these societies to ethnic maps. Next, I join these maps to raster
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FIGURE 1. Slavery
Red circles indicate presence of slavery. Blue circles indicate absence.
data on historical population density. I begin with five ethnic maps. First, I join African
societies to ethnic groups mapped by Murdock (1959). Second, I merge First Nations
groups in the United States and Canada with maps from the Handbook of North Amer-
ican Indians (Heizer and Sturtevant, 1978).2 Third, I join ethnic groups from the rest of
the world to Global Mapping International’s (GMI) detailed World Language Mapping
System. Fourth, if no match can be found in the GMI map, I use the less detailed Geo-
Referencing Ethnic Groups (GREG) map of Weidmann et al. (2010). Finally, if no match
can be found in any of these, I match groups to modern administrative boundaries. For
example, the Nunivak are matched to Nunivak Island.
I use the historical maps first in order to reduce migration-induced errors. The Mur-
dock (1959) and Heizer and Sturtevant (1978) maps show ethnic groups prior to Eu-
ropean contact. I am not aware of similar historical maps for Asia or Latin America,
necessitating use of the more modern GMI and GREG maps. Of 1,267 societies, 76 are
matched to a larger group of which they form a smaller part (such as the Efik to the
Ibibio). 100 groups that cannot be found in any map, instead of being matched to a
modern administrative boundary, are matched to polygons representing ethnic groups
in the same location. For example, the Kara of Ukerewe Island do not appear in any
of the ethnic maps. Because the Kerewe people occupy roughly the same territory as
the Kara, the Kara are assigned the geographic characteristics of the polygon labeled
“Kerewe” in the Murdock (1959) map. A full table of matches and a map of the assem-
bled polygons are given in the web appendix.3
2These were digitized for the United States by Dippel (2010) and for Canada by myself.
3The Ethnographic Atlas gives co-ordinates for each society. All but 46 of these societies are within 500
km of the centroid of the polygon to which they are joined. Of these discrepancies, 22 are due to obvious
errors in the Ethnographic Atlas. For example, the Ethnographic Atlas gives the Koreans a coordinate that
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All historical population reconstructions are guesses. One book on pre-Columbian
America is entitled “Numbers from Nowhere” (Henige, 1998). The principal measure I
use for historical population density is from the History Database of the Global Envi-
ronment (HYDE) version 3.1. This raster data on historical population covers the years
1500, 1600, and every ten years since 1700. For each ethnic group, I measure historical
population density as the average of the raster points within its territory for the year of
observation recorded in the Ethnographic Atlas.4
Details of these estimates are reported by Bouwman et al. (2006), Klein Goldewijk
et al. (2010) and Klein Goldewijk (2005). This data source takes as its base a map of 3441
administrative units from 222 countries. Historical data are then reconstructed on this
base map using Lahmeyer (2004), Helders (2000), Tobler (1995), several local studies,
interpolation, and back projection. The data are reported on a five minute grid.
I plot historical population density for my base sample of ethnic groups in Figure 2. I
present the percentiles of the HYDE data and the two principal alternatives, described
below, in Table 1. These range from nearly zero persons per square mile for several
groups in the Mato Grosso and interior Amazon, to over 3,000 persons per square mile
for the Okinawans of Japan.5
Because historical population reconstruction is unavoidably inexact, it is important
to show that the results can be obtained using alternatives to the HYDE estimates.
The alternative sources of historical population data are not in raster format, and are
often recorded at a lower resolution than the observations in the Ethnographic Atlas.
For example, one number may be given for an entire country. I adopt a simple method
to estimate spatially disaggregated historic population densities for the societies in my
data using these alternative sources. I begin with raster data on population density in
1995 for each of these ethnic groups and combine it with historical estimates for the
broader regions within which these groups are located. Specifically, my alternative esti-
mates take the form:
Historical population density =Population density in 1995×(2)
Regional density at the date of observation
Regional density in 1995
.
is in Tibet. 14 are groups that cover diffuse areas, making it difficult to assign them a meaningful coordi-
nate. These include Russians and the Eastern Cree. 8 are given coordinates in the Ethnographic Atlas that
differ from their locations in the other maps for no obvious reason. The remaining two are idiosyncratic.
The GMI map divides the Botocudos into 3 polygons. Two of are in Minas Gerais, as expected, but one is
in Rio Grande do Sul. Second, the polygon that represents the Diegueno in Heizer and Sturtevant (1978)
is truncated at the US border.
4For computational reasons, I use data from each 50 year interval, imputing intermediate years exponen-
tially.
5This is an over-estimate due to over-representation of Naha in the original data; administrate records
give a modern density of just above 1,500 persons per square mile. Results are robust to excluding the
Okinawans (see the web appendix).
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FIGURE 2. Historical population density
Red circles indicate denser population. Blue circles indicate sparser population.
This assumes that the relative distribution of population has not changed within re-
gions over time. If the Tamil were 1.37 times as dense as the entirety of the broad re-
gion “India” in 1995, this ratio is pushed back to 1880, the date at which they are ob-
served. GIS data on population in 1995 is from the Food and Agriculture Organization’s
Global Agro-Ecological Zones project (FAO-GAEZ). I use two sources of regional esti-
mates. The first is McEvedy and Jones (1978). There are well-known problems with
these data (Austin, 2008b; Hopkins, 2009), and so I also use the ARVE Group’s estimates
(Krumhardt, 2010).
While only a first-order approximation, this approach is preferable to using the un-
weighted regional densities directly. McEvedy and Jones (1978), for example, assign a
single population density to all of Canada. To treat the the Inuit and Ojibwe as equally
dense would be implausible, and would introduce substantial measurement error.6 In
addition to these two main alternatives, I use the 1995 densities directly.
These data reveal a positive correlation between land rights and historic population
density, and an inverse-U relationship between slavery and historic population den-
sity (see Figure 3). As I discuss in Section 4, this is consistent with certain models that
make arguments similar to the land abundance view. This is not, however, dispositive.
Population density and institutions are both shaped by the same geographic forcing
variables. As a result, I gather data on several other geographic characteristics of these
societies, and test the extent to which historic population and institutions are predicted
by features of the natural environment.
6Ruff (2006) suggests that the Northeast had a population density at contact roughly seven times that of
the Arctic. The method used here assigns the Ojibwe a historic population density of 2.20 per square mile
and the Copper Eskimo a population density of 0.31 per square mile – a roughly seven-fold difference.
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FIGURE 3. Slavery and historical population density
2.4. Geographic data. I join societies from the Ethnographic Atlas to several sources of
geographic raster data. Sources and definitions for each variable are given in the web
appendix. Each of the continuous variables are re-scaled as a standard normal variable
for the regressions, so that marginal effects can be interpreted as the effect of a one
standard-deviation change in the geographic variable.
The first control is land quality. To measure this, I re-scale Fischer et al.’s (2002) index
of climate, soil and terrain slope constrains on rain-fed agriculture. Larger values of the
re-scaled variable indicate better land. An advantage of this constraints-based measure
is that it is not based on expected yields in contemporary agriculture. Crop diversity is
greater today for many of the societies than at the time they are observed in the Ethno-
graphic Atlas.7 I also control for the presence of a major river, distance to the coast,
elevation, the percentage of the society’s territory in which malaria is endemic, precip-
itation, ruggedness, temperature, date of observation, absolute latitude, share desert,
and the coefficient of variation of annual rainfall. This latter variable is intended as a
measure of ecological risk.
2.5. Modern outcomes. I use two separate approaches to test whether ethnic institu-
tions predict economic outcomes in the present day. First, I use the populations of the
ethnic groups recorded in the Atlas Narodov Mira (1964) to aggregate these institutions
7I do not adjust this measure to account for the spatial distribution of population, because this approach
is very sensitive to measurement error. For example, it gives implausibly high estimates of land quality in
the Arctic and Sahara.
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to the country level. A table of matches between the ethnic groups in the Ethnographic
Atlas and the Atlas Narodov Mira (1964) is given in the web appendix. I use OLS to esti-
mate:
yi = βinstitutioni + x
′
iγ + j.(3)
Here, yi is the natural log of PPP GDP per capita in 2005, taken from the World Devel-
opment Indicators. institutioni is the fraction of the pre-colonial population that pos-
sesses the institution of interest (for example, slavery). β is the coefficient of interest.
xi is a vector of controls that are commonly used by papers in the cross-country growth
literature. These are: a constant, ethnic fractionalization (calculated directly from the
Atlas Narodov Mira (1964)), absolute latitude, log land area in 1500, landlocked, island,
percentage catholic, percentage muslim, log population density in 1500, colonizer dum-
mies (from Acemoglu et al. (2002b)), and percentage malarial in 1946 (from Gallup and
Sachs (2001)).
These data were supplemented for some countries using other sources, detailed in
the web appendix. Summary statistics for these data are also contained in the web ap-
pendix. I estimate (3) separately for African and Asian countries. The sample includes
countries for which presence or absence of the institution is known for at least half the
population. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are used. I do not include the
Americas, because the large mestizo and overseas European populations in these re-
gions makes it impossible to compute institutioni credibly. Ethnographic Atlas coverage
of Europe is too thin to allow institutioni to be computed for most European countries.
Second, I compile data on 494,157 women from 34 sub-Saharan countries captured in
the Demographic and Health Surveys. I have created this data set for a different project,
and the details of these data are reported in Fenske (2012a). Using the ethnic groups
reported in these data, I am able to merge these women with historical institutions from
the Ethnographic Atlas. I use OLS to estimate:
yijc = βinstitutionj + x
′
ijcγ + δc + ijc.(4)
Here, yijc is one of two outcomes for woman i, from ethnic group j, in country-round
c. First, the DHS use factor analysis to construct a “wealth index” based on owner-
ship of durable goods. Because this is constructed separately for each country-round,
I normalize this as a standard normal variable using the mean and standard deviation
for each country-round. Second, I use the woman’s years of education as an outcome.
institutionjc is the presence or absence of an historical institution for the woman’s eth-
nic group. β is the coefficient of interest. The vector of controls, xijc includes age, age
squared, urban, and dummies for religion. δc is a country-round fixed effect. I cluster
standard errors at the level of the woman’s ethnic group.
LAND ABUNDANCE 11
3. RESULTS
In this section, I report my main results. I do not interpret these until later, in Section
4. In Section 3.1, I outline the principal geographic correlates of land rights, slavery, and
historic population. In Section 3.2, I outline the robustness checks that are reported
in the web appendix. In Section, 3.3, I discuss whether these institutions can predict
outcomes in the present-day.
3.1. Main results.
3.1.1. Land rights. In Table 2, I report my main results concerning land rights. Land
quality positively predicts land rights in both the full sample and the sub-Saharan Africa
sub-sample. In the baseline, a one standard deviation increase in land quality increases
the probability that land rights exist by 5 percentage points. This effect disappears, how-
ever, when fixed effects for the major ethnographic regions are included.
Precipitation has a negative and significant correlation with land rights in the base-
line, but this is not significant within the sub-Saharan sample nor with major region
fixed effects included. Temperature is only significantly negative within major regions.
Societies that are observed later are more likely to possess land rights, though this too
does not hold within regions or within sub-Saharan Africa. Malaria prevalence pre-
dicts land rights in all three specifications, though it is statistically weak within sub-
Saharan Africa. Ruggedness positively predicts land rights in the baseline and within
sub-Saharan Africa, though it is not statistically robust within major regions. Land rights
become less common as one moves away from the equator. I find no effect of distance
from the coast, elevation, the coefficient of variation of rainfall, or access to a major river
in any specification.
3.1.2. Slavery. In Table 3, I report my main results concerning slavery. There is a pos-
itive but insignificant relationship between land quality and slavery in the global sam-
ple. This is due to the high incidence of slavery in the Pacific Northwest; if a control
is added for a society’s dependence on fishing, the effect of land quality becomes pos-
itive and significant, though not with fixed effects (not reported). Within sub-Saharan
Africa the correlation is larger and more significant. A one standard deviation increase
in land quality predicts a 5 percentage point increase the probability of slavery within
sub-Saharan Africa.
The positive correlations of slavery with temperature and malarial prevalence are ro-
bust across specifications and samples. There is a negative correlation between date of
observation and slavery that survives the inclusion of major region fixed effects. It is not
significant within Africa. Similarly, slavery is more common in rugged areas and further
from the equator, even with major-region fixed effects, though these correlations do not
hold within Africa. The magnitude of the correlation between access to a major river
and slavery is large across specifications (5-8 percentage points), though the standard
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error is also large and the estimate is not significant at conventional levels. I find no ef-
fect of precipitation, share desert, distance from the coast, elevation, or the coefficient
of variation of rainfall in any specification.
3.1.3. Population density. In Table 4, I report my main results concerning population
density. Here, coefficients can be interpreted directly as the impact of a one standard-
deviation change in the right-hand-side variable. A one standard deviation increase in
land quality is associated here with a large increase in population density; the effect is
between 54 and 73% in the whole-world sample, and 15% in the sub-Saharan sample.
Precipitation depresses population in the base sample and within Africa, though this
is not robust to the inclusion of major-region fixed effects. Societies that are observed
later are also more densely settled, though this correlation does not hold within major
regions.
Societies further from the coast are more sparsely settled, though this is only statisti-
cally robust within major regions, and does not hold within Africa. Across specifications,
there is a negative correlation between population density and elevation. In the base-
line, population is most dense where malaria is most prevalent, though this is not true
within major regions and is of marginal significance within Africa. Rugged societies are
more densely settled, though this too is not robust within major regions. Societies fur-
ther from the equator are more thickly populated. Population density is negatively cor-
related with the coefficient of variation of rainfall and positively associated with access
to a major river, though the robustness of this correlation varies across specifications.
There is no significant link between historical population density and temperature.
3.1.4. Slavery and crop suitability. In Table 5, I extend the main results concerning slav-
ery. I include the suitability of the ethnic group’s territory for rain-fed cultivation of
the crop types reported by the FAO-GAEZ: cereals, roots/tubers, pulses, oil crops, sugar,
and cotton. The magnitude and significance of the other controls do not change in
any meaningful way from Table 3. Roots/tubers and oil crops enter negatively, though
roots/tubers is only marginally significant in the global sample. Pulses and sugar enter
positively, though these are only statistically significant with major region fixed effects,
or in the African sub-sample.
3.2. Robustness. Because the institutions reported in the Ethnographic Atlas are re-
ported roughly at the time of first European description, it is possible that African slav-
ery in this sample is contaminated by the institutional legacies of the slave trade. I show
in the web appendix that the effect of ethnicity-level Atlantic slave exports reported by
Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) on indigenous African slavery is insignificant, while there
does appear to be a positive correlation between Indian Ocean slave exports and slavery
across African ethnic groups. If the slave trade were responsible for establishing slavery
in Africa, this would be expected to bias the coefficient on distance from the coast in
a negative direction, since African societies closest to the coast were hardest hit by the
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slave trade. If, however, I include an interaction term between “sub-Saharan Africa” and
“distance to coast” Table 3, the main effect does not change, while the interaction is
small and insignificant (not reported).
The measures of land rights and slavery are coarse indicators. I test in the web ap-
pendix whether alternative measures of these institutions give results consistent with
Tables 2 and 3. Similarly, I use three alternative measures of historical population, at-
tempting to re-create the results of Table 4. While many estimates move in and out of
significance, most of these are small changes in magnitude. Some exceptions are worth
noting. Malaria changes sign when land inheritance by children is used as a dependent
variable, and distance from the coast has a much larger marginal effect when patrilin-
eal inheritance of land is used as an outcome. With alternative measures of slavery,
date of observation, temperature and malaria become insignificant and quantitatively
small. Date of observation is a poor predictor of population density in the present day,
and the coefficient of variation of rainfall is not a significant predictor of the alternative
historical population measures.
Because land rights and slavery are missing for several observations, I show in the
web appendix that the results are similar when estimated on a consistent sample for
which both institutions are known. I also show that the main results do not perform well
when observations are weighted by their estimated populations. Though this would be
expected to correct the influence of the large number of small societies on the results, it
instead only adds noise to the analysis, because this procedure multiplies any errors in
estimated population densities by errors in estimated area.
Results are also broadly similar with absolute latitude excluded. Excluding high lever-
age observations also has little effect on the results. I show that controlling for the possi-
ble endogeneity of land quality also shows that its effect is not overstated in the baseline
specification.
3.3. Modern outcomes. In Table 6, I report my estimates of equation (3). These are
the country-level correlations between historic institutions and contemporary income.
This is extends the results of Bezemer et al. (2009) and Gennaioli and Rainer (2007) to
cover Asia, and to include additional institutions (land rights and polygamy) that they
do not. Though state centralization and polygyny have not been discussed above, they
are institutions that have been given attention by the “land abundance” view of African
history and in the broader economic literature, and so they are included here.
Across institutions, the African countries that were most “advanced” before colonial
rule are poorest today. Land rights, slavery, and polygamy are all negatively correlated
with modern income, though statistical power becomes a problem when controlling for
both geographic characteristics and colonizer identity at once. This is not simply the
story of greater European settlement laid out by Acemoglu et al. (2002b). Across speci-
fications, it is a similar set of relatively high-income countries that with low prevalence
of the institutions that drive this correlation. Namibia, Equitorial Guinea, and Gabon
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stand out in the land rights regression; excepting Namibia, these countries also had rel-
atively low levels of slavery, as did the relatively prosperous nations of Botswana, South
Africa, Mauritius, Swaziland, and Cape Verde. Gabon and Equatorial Guinea stand out
as relatively rich countries that lacked pre-colonial states.
The countries that drive the polygamy result are different; here it is mostly North
African states (Algeria, Tunisia, Western Sahara) and offshore islands (Mauritius, Cape
Verde) where incomes are high and polygamy is relatively uncommon. This result de-
pends on the definition of polygamy used in the regression. In these North African
states, polygamy was historically present for most of the population, though it was not
the norm. If “any polygyny,” rather than “usual polygyny” is used, there is no similar
correlation.
The same pattern does not appear for Asia. The negative correlation between land
rights and modern income does not survive geographic controls. There is a negative cor-
relation between historical state centralization and modern income, but this is driven
entirely by oil-rich gulf states – Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. Arab
societies in the Ethnographic Atlas are generally coded as having low levels of state cen-
tralization.
In Table 7, I report my estimates of equation (4). These show the correlations between
historic institutions and individual outcomes in the sub-Saharan DHS data. Women
from ethnic groups that possessed land rights are wealthier today in terms of durable
goods ownership. The most conservative specification suggests that land rights are as-
sociated with one third of a standard deviation increase in durable goods ownership. No
similar results are found for other institutions. Women whose societies practiced slav-
ery before colonial rule receive between 1.3 and 3.0 fewer years of education, though
this result is not robust to the inclusion of country-round dummies.8
4. FACTS AND THEORIES
The results presented above have been descriptive, uncovering geographic variables
that predict land rights, slavery, and historic population density. In this section, I discuss
whether these correlations are consistent with influential theories of land rights and
slavery.
4.1. Theories of land rights. The two most influential theories of land rights are those
of Boserup (1965) and Demsetz (1967). Boserup (1965) argues that exogenous popula-
tion increase is the principal driver of agricultural intensification and more permanent
8I have also tested whether these institutions predict whether the respondent is working, and whether her
partner has a low status or high status occupation. Slavery, land rights and polygamy positively predict
that a woman is working, but this correlation does not survive country fixed effects. Slavery predicts her
partner has a low status occupation, though this does not hold within countries. The pattern for high sta-
tus occupations is the reverse. Land rights and polygamy both negatively predict a low status occupation,
but only within countries. There are no significant correlations between land rights, polygamy and high
status occupations.
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tenure. This is the intuition captured by the “land abundance” view of African history.
Austin (2009, p. 33), for example, argues that authorities were were eager to attract more
immigrants in order to subdue nature and their neighbors. Thus, strangers could gen-
erally acquire land indefinitely for token payments, while citizens were given land vir-
tually for free (Austin, 2008a, p. 591-594). Formalizations of this theory have captured
these changes as the selection of certain production technologies in response to the rel-
ative scarcity of land and labor (Hayami, 1997; Quisumbing and Otsuka, 2001), or as the
profit-maximizing choice of an elite (Lagerlo¨f, 2009).
Demsetz (1967), by contrast, focuses on trade. He argues that land rights internalize
externalities when the gains outweigh the costs. This drives enclosure of the commons
in the formal treatments of Hotte et al. (2000) or Copeland and Taylor (2009), and ex-
plains the empirical results of Bogart and Richardson (2011). It is similar to the greater
effort expended in defending rights over more valuable resources predicted by models
of the economics of conflict (e.g. Baker (2003); Grossman and Kim (1995)).
Beyond these two influential theories, there is a literature on the enclosure of com-
mon property (e.g. Baland and Francois (2005); Baland and Platteau (2003); Grantham
(1980); Lueck (1994); Netting (1976); Ostrom (1991); Runge (1986)). These works identify
several benefits of common property that help explain why it survives. These include
scale economies, risk pooling, exclusion and effort costs, and equity concerns.
The positive correlation of population density and land rights is congruent with the
Boserup (1965) view, though it does not specify the mechanism by which land scarcity
leads property rights to emerge. That better land predicts land rights is consistent with
both Boserup (1965) and Demsetz (1967), since both models predict that more valuable
land will be more strongly defended. The lower prevalence of land rights further from
the equator is driven by the Arctic and the deserts of Australia, reinforcing this interpre-
tation.
The positive correlation between land rights and the date of observation is congruent
with an evolutionary model similar to that of Lagerlo¨f (2009). Counter to the Demsetz
(1967) view, the two controls that best capture trade in the data – proximity to the coast
and access to a major river – do not significantly predict the existence of land rights.
Within Africa, coastal distance enters significantly, but with the wrong sign. The lack of
a significant correlation with ecological risk and land rights is inconsistent with models
suggesting that common property over land is motivated by risk pooling.
4.2. Theories of slavery. Several theoretical analyses of slavery and coercion exist (e.g.
Barzel (1977); Bergstrom (1971); Canarella and Tomaske (1975); Findlay (1975); Geni-
cot (2002)). Three of the most influential theories stress labor scarcity, the outside op-
tions available to workers, and the productivity of forced labor in specific tasks. Nieboer
(1900) and Domar (1970) both argue that coercion is cheaper than paying a wage when
labor is scarce and wages high. Proponents of the “land abundance” view of African
history, such as Austin (2008a, p. 606-610), build on this argument. Lagerlo¨f (2009) and
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Conning (2004) both provide models that formally capture this intuition. In Lagerlo¨f
(2009), very low population densities also discourage slavery, since the opportunity cost
of labor used to guard slaves is very high.
Several theories emphasize coerced workers’ outside options. North and Thomas
(1971), for example, hold that serfs voluntarily exchanged their labor for protection.
Several models find that worse outside options for workers increase the degree of co-
ercion in labor contracts (Beber and Blattman, 2012; Chwe, 1990).9 Similarly, Acemoglu
and Wolitzky (2011) find that labor scarcity has two effects, raising coercion through a
Domar-type increase in the price of output, but also reducing coercion by improving
workers’ outside options.
In certain contexts, slavery may be more productive than free labor, which explains
its use. For Fenoaltea (1984), this occurs where “pain incentives” are effective and de-
tailed care is unnecessary. Fogel and Engerman (1974) link the productivity of slaves
in the American south to economies of scale that could only be achieved through gang
labor. Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), similarly, argue that the cultivation of crops with
economies of scale is more conducive to slavery. Hanes (1996) explains the concentra-
tion of slaves in rural and domestic production by invoking the high turnover costs in
these industries.
The inverse-U correlation between slavery and population density is similar to the
pattern predicted by the Lagerlo¨f (2009) model, though this would be predicted by many
possible models in which slavery emerges during an intermediate state of development.
Similarly, that slavery is less likely among societies observed at later dates is congruent
with a model in which slavery disappears at later stages.
The evidence on outside options is mixed. Greater temperatures indicate less hos-
pitable environments, where escape is more difficult. Slavery is more common in these
regions. By contrast, ruggedness is expected to improve the outside option of slaves by
making it easier for them to flee (Nunn and Puga, 2012). Contrary to this intuition, the
correlation between ruggedness and slavery is positive.
The evidence for productivity in specific tasks is also mixed. There appears to be no
strong link between slavery and distance from the coast, which would suggest that trade
does not matter. Access to a major river performs better, though it is not statistically ro-
bust. By contrast, the crop suitability measures in Table 5 do have predictive power.
These do not, however, map neatly into any classification according to economies of
scale or productivity under gang labor. Caribbean-type sugar plantations are not a fea-
ture of the indigenous societies in the data.
In sum, the broad correlations uncovered in Tables 2 and 3 are consistent with the
Boserupian view of land rights. There is mixed evidence for the Demsetz view. Slavery
is systematically correlated with population density in a manner consistent with some
9Naidu and Yuchtman (2012), by contrast, argue that British industrial workers committed to coercive
contracts in order to reduce wage variation.
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evolutionary models, but the geographic predictors of slavery do not offer unqualified
support to any particular theory.
5. CONCLUSION
Bad institutions are one of the fundamental causes of African poverty, and the institu-
tions that exist on the continent currently have been shaped by those that existed prior
to colonial rule. I have addressed a theme in the economics literature – how geogra-
phy affects institutions – by outlining the geographic features that predict the historical
prevalence of land rights, slavery, and dense population.
Though this exercise has been mostly descriptive, these results can be used to make
several points relevant to existing theories about land rights, slavery, and African history.
Historical population has evolved alongside these institutions in response to underlying
geographic characteristics. While institutional outcomes across broad ethnographic re-
gions are predicted by geography, these predictions become more tenuous when look-
ing within specific regions. Within Africa and across the world, there is stronger evi-
dence that land rights are present where land is scarce and productive than there is of
any link with trade. Though the results are suggestive of connections between slavery
and labor scarcity, workers’ outside options, and the relative productivity of slaves in
certain tasks, they cannot distinguish any one explanation with dispositive clarity.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mean s.d. Min Max N Pct.
5 0.02 0.05 0.29
Any slavery 0.54 0.50 0 1 1,040 10 0.09 0.17 0.59
Any land rights 0.74 0.44 0 1 801 15 0.26 0.28 1.21
Historic pop density 42.7 141 2.6e-07 3,627 1,205 20 0.51 0.49 1.92
Land quality 1.33 0.90 -4.0e-07 3.98 1,205 25 1.21 0.88 2.58
Date observed 1,905 53.1 1,500 1,965 1,205 30 2.39 1.96 3.79
Precipitation 1,262 855 12.6 6,164 1,205 35 3.70 3.86 5.07
Temperature 7,198 2,776 35.5 10,830 1,205 40 5.78 7.08 6.61
Absolute latitude 20.7 17.0 0.017 78.1 1,205 45 7.64 10.03 8.27
Pct. malarial 0.17 0.20 0 0.69 1,205 50 10.04 14.72 10.10
Dist. to coast 4.26 3.88 0 16.5 1,205 55 12.56 19.39 13.11
Elevation 167 9.60 141 230 1,205 60 15.78 24.39 17.33
Major river 0.28 0.45 0 1 1,205 65 20.14 32.31 22.56
Ruggedness 121,220 132,855 137 977,941 1,205 70 25.97 40.25 29.84
Share desert 0.11 0.26 0 1 1,205 75 35.17 55.00 39.13
Rainfall C.V. 0.21 0.13 0.061 1.73 1,205 80 47.25 76.05 53.36
ln (1+ Atlantic exports/area) 0.16 0.51 0 3.66 532 85 62.98 105.86 71.90
ln (1+ Indian exports/area) 0.037 0.23 0 3.33 532 90 95.85 151.97 115.18
95 162.79 246.17 197.82
Any land 
rights
Any 
slavery
Historic 
pop 
density N
Africa 0.93 0.83 35.42 414
     + Ethiopia and the Horn + Moslem Sudan 0.93 0.84 35.51 486
     + Sahara + North Africa 0.93 0.84 35.65 526
Circum-Mediterranean 0.92 0.70 64.53 157
East Eurasia 0.83 0.54 154.27 123
Insular Pacific 0.73 0.24 41.74 119
North America 0.29 0.27 5.02 284
South America 0.27 0.27 12.21 109
Notes: Variable definitions are in the web appendix.
Means by major region
Table 1
Summary statistics and percentiles of population density
HYDE 
Estimate MJ Base
ARVE 
Base
coef. s.e. mfx coef. s.e. mfx coef. s.e. mfx
Constant 1.406 0.183 2.049 0.454 1.190 0.524
Land quality 0.334 0.143 0.048 0.070 0.131 0.010 0.601 0.249 0.024
Precipitation -0.356 0.154 -0.051 0.097 0.208 0.014 -0.136 0.558 -0.005
Temperature -0.177 0.266 -0.026 -0.629 0.291 -0.089 0.240 0.337 0.010
Date observed 0.326 0.162 0.047 0.018 0.121 0.003 -0.635 0.379 -0.026
Share desert 0.143 0.148 0.020 0.033 0.240 0.004 -0.330 0.395 -0.013
Dist. to coast -0.163 0.160 -0.023 -0.103 0.167 -0.014 0.525 0.328 0.021
Elevation -0.061 0.156 -0.009 -0.142 0.176 -0.020 -0.475 0.298 -0.019
Pct. malarial 1.201 0.227 0.173 0.481 0.248 0.068 0.393 0.267 0.016
Ruggedness 0.376 0.142 0.054 0.246 0.159 0.035 1.090 0.471 0.044
Absolute latitude -0.716 0.265 -0.103 -1.045 0.353 -0.147 -2.344 0.740 -0.094
Rainfall C.V. -0.091 0.142 -0.013 -0.178 0.146 -0.025 -0.126 0.337 -0.005
Major river -0.173 0.243 -0.025 -0.147 0.273 -0.021 -0.236 0.495 -0.010
Circum-Mediterranean 1.321 0.921 0.136
East Eurasia 0.072 0.728 0.010
Insular Pacific -1.404 0.666 -0.270
North America -1.939 0.838 -0.369
South America -2.987 0.724 -0.627
Observations
Table 2
(1) (2)
Full Sample S.S. Africa
Geographic correlates of land rights
Notes: Dependent variable is any land rights. All regressions are Conley's logit, with a distance cutoff of
10 decimal degrees. "coef." is the estimated coefficient. "s.e." is the standard error adjusted for spatial
dependence. "mfx" is the marginal effect. This is the effect of a one standard deviation change for
continuous variables, and a one unit change for dummy variables. 
(3)
801 801 371
coef. s.e. mfx coef. s.e. mfx coef. s.e. mfx
Constant 0.323 0.190 0.906 0.398 0.214 0.769
Land quality 0.132 0.121 0.031 0.081 0.132 0.019 0.685 0.190 0.054
Precipitation -0.163 0.195 -0.039 0.224 0.195 0.054 0.230 0.484 0.018
Temperature 0.928 0.268 0.221 0.766 0.232 0.184 1.689 0.486 0.132
Date observed -0.215 0.095 -0.051 -0.350 0.110 -0.084 -0.248 0.340 -0.019
Share desert 0.040 0.168 0.009 0.032 0.147 0.008 0.445 0.381 0.035
Dist. to coast 0.140 0.127 0.033 0.164 0.127 0.039 0.033 0.215 0.003
Elevation 0.110 0.118 0.026 0.007 0.121 0.002 -0.009 0.350 -0.001
Pct. malarial 1.819 0.211 0.434 1.535 0.253 0.369 1.110 0.400 0.087
Ruggedness 0.578 0.118 0.138 0.553 0.129 0.133 0.285 0.374 0.022
Absolute latitude 0.736 0.300 0.175 0.871 0.303 0.209 -0.051 0.845 -0.004
Rainfall C.V. 0.082 0.129 0.020 0.140 0.120 0.034 -0.127 0.433 -0.010
Major river 0.350 0.197 0.082 0.303 0.209 0.072 0.779 0.498 0.053
Circum-Mediterranean 0.333 0.580 0.077
East Eurasia -0.530 0.646 -0.130
Insular Pacific -1.752 0.834 -0.404
North America -1.409 0.673 -0.338
South America -0.886 0.569 -0.218
Observations
Table 3
1040 1040 416
Notes: Dependent variable is any slavery. All regressions are Conley's logit, with a distance cutoff of 10
decimal degrees. "coef." is the estimated coefficient. "s.e." is the standard error adjusted for spatial
dependence. "mfx" is the marginal effect. This is the effect of a one standard deviation change for
continuous variables, and a one unit change for dummy variables. 
Geographic correlates of slavery
(3)
S.S. Africa
(1) (2)
Full Sample
coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e.
Constant 1.466 0.205 2.144 0.227 1.785 0.218
Land quality 0.727 0.146 0.543 0.109 0.145 0.076
Precipitation -0.763 0.218 -0.190 0.191 -0.327 0.200
Temperature 0.231 0.364 -0.115 0.255 0.146 0.164
Date observed 0.471 0.139 0.071 0.106 0.914 0.122
Share desert -0.114 0.212 -0.204 0.159 -0.193 0.085
Dist. to coast -0.328 0.205 -0.339 0.149 0.020 0.099
Elevation -0.299 0.164 -0.276 0.135 -0.601 0.122
Pct. malarial 0.574 0.247 -0.095 0.146 0.221 0.121
Ruggedness 0.542 0.191 0.211 0.150 0.676 0.150
Absolute latitude -0.757 0.362 -0.981 0.306 -0.999 0.244
Rainfall C.V. -0.320 0.204 -0.331 0.160 -0.148 0.122
Major river 0.292 0.214 0.407 0.167 0.084 0.113
Circum-Mediterranean 1.205 0.352
East Eurasia 1.559 0.381
Insular Pacific -1.609 0.547
North America -2.139 0.596
South America -4.036 0.780
Observations
Table 4
1205 1205 486
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of historic population
density. All regressions are Conley's OLS, with a distance cutoff of 10 decimal
degrees. "coef." is the estimated coefficient. "s.e." is the standard error adjusted for
spatial dependence. Because the continuous right-hand-side variables have been
normalized as N(0,1), coefficients can be interpreted as the marginal effect of a one
standard deviation increase.
Geographic correlates of historic population density
Full Sample S.S. Africa
(1) (2) (3)
coef. s.e. mfx coef. s.e. mfx coef. s.e. mfx
Constant 0.311 0.183 0.951 0.407 0.245 0.864
Land quality 0.195 0.147 0.047 0.339 0.149 0.082 0.743 0.272 0.042
Precipitation -0.045 0.219 -0.011 0.353 0.223 0.085 0.842 0.789 0.047
Temperature 0.875 0.284 0.209 0.622 0.273 0.150 1.726 0.418 0.097
Date observed -0.222 0.098 -0.053 -0.372 0.126 -0.090 -0.647 0.376 -0.036
Share desert 0.036 0.189 0.008 -0.044 0.161 -0.011 0.372 0.447 0.021
Dist. to coast 0.147 0.123 0.035 0.191 0.119 0.046 0.029 0.217 0.002
Elevation 0.140 0.122 0.033 0.019 0.129 0.005 0.108 0.360 0.006
Pct. malarial 1.933 0.219 0.462 1.568 0.259 0.378 1.625 0.420 0.092
Ruggedness 0.504 0.130 0.120 0.415 0.131 0.100 -0.019 0.479 -0.001
Absolute latitude 0.671 0.292 0.160 0.789 0.300 0.190 -0.346 0.939 -0.019
Rainfall C.V. 0.103 0.124 0.025 0.111 0.115 0.027 -0.322 0.488 -0.018
Major river 0.387 0.211 0.091 0.365 0.222 0.086 0.838 0.596 0.040
Wheat suitability 0.091 0.156 0.022 -0.213 0.186 -0.051 0.189 0.378 0.011
Maize  suitability 0.036 0.321 0.009 0.238 0.325 0.057 0.550 0.725 0.031
Cereals  suitability 0.381 0.349 0.091 0.022 0.351 0.005 -0.060 0.533 -0.003
Roots/tubers  suitability -0.549 0.305 -0.131 -0.529 0.314 -0.128 -1.679 0.549 -0.095
Pulses  suitability 0.566 0.327 0.135 0.647 0.328 0.156 1.441 0.477 0.081
Oil crops  suitability -1.029 0.320 -0.246 -1.255 0.295 -0.302 -2.045 0.359 -0.115
Sugar  suitability 0.265 0.189 0.063 0.528 0.205 0.127 1.034 0.485 0.058
Cotton  suitability 0.315 0.297 0.075 0.378 0.302 0.091 0.515 0.528 0.029
Circum-Mediterranean 0.799 0.614 0.176
East Eurasia -0.858 0.671 -0.211
Insular Pacific -2.237 0.919 -0.483
North America -1.570 0.685 -0.373
South America -1.105 0.607 -0.269
Observations 1040 1040 416
Notes: Dependent variable is any slavery. All regressions are Conley's logit, with a distance cutoff of 10
decimal degrees. "coef." is the estimated coefficient. "s.e." is the standard error adjusted for spatial
dependence. "mfx" is the marginal effect. This is the effect of a one standard deviation change for
continuous variables, and a one unit change for dummy variables.
Table 5
Geographic correlates of slavery, including crop suitabilities
(1) (2) (3)
Full Sample S.S. Africa
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pct. with Any land rights -1.77** -1.52** -1.15 -0.83 -1.75*** -1.76*** -0.44 -0.94
(0.715) (0.693) (1.066) (1.297) (0.319) (0.473) (0.860) (0.964)
Colonial Dummies N Y N Y N Y N Y
Controls N N Y Y N N Y Y
Observations 45 45 45 45 30 30 30 30
R-squared 0.069 0.148 0.219 0.257 0.164 0.288 0.582 0.714
Pct. with Any slavery -1.82*** -1.98*** -2.06** -1.93 0.59 0.49 0.64 0.46
(0.467) (0.595) (0.987) (1.248) (0.468) (0.515) (0.633) (0.690)
Colonial Dummies N Y N Y N Y N Y
Controls N N Y Y N N Y Y
Observations 48 48 48 48 34 34 34 34
R-squared 0.126 0.223 0.243 0.285 0.041 0.104 0.603 0.723
Pct. with State cent.: At least 2 levels -0.45 -0.53 -1.40* -1.32 -1.66*** -1.56*** -1.44** -0.96
(0.768) (0.677) (0.715) (0.906) (0.336) (0.395) (0.530) (0.911)
Colonial Dummies N Y N Y N Y N Y
Controls N N Y Y N N Y Y
Observations 46 46 46 46 34 34 34 34
R-squared 0.008 0.114 0.233 0.260 0.185 0.230 0.657 0.738
Pct. with Usual polygyny -1.30*** -1.19** -1.62** -1.75* 0.55 0.71 0.03 0.71
(0.439) (0.450) (0.802) (0.989) (0.773) (0.741) (0.676) (0.669)
Colonial Dummies N Y N Y N Y N Y
Controls N N Y Y N N Y Y
Observations 49 49 49 49 34 34 34 34
R-squared 0.089 0.169 0.236 0.283 0.021 0.107 0.586 0.737
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(PPP GDP/cap), 2005. All regressions are OLS, with robust standard errors reported in
parentheses. Controls are ethnic fractionalization, absolute latitude, log land area in 1500, landlocked, island, percentage
catholic, percentage muslim, log population density in 1500, and percentage malarial in 1946.
Africa Asia
Table 6
Historic institutions and modern GDP per capita (country-level)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Any land rights 0.58*** 0.36*** 0.32*** -0.82 -0.27 1.09
(0.108) (0.056) (0.113) (1.264) (0.487) (0.890)
Other controls N Y Y N Y N
Country-round fixed effects N N Y N N Y
Observations 94,271 94,271 94,271 235,226 235,226 235,226
Any slavery -0.06 0.07 -0.02 -3.03*** -1.33** -0.38
(0.172) (0.110) (0.103) (0.713) (0.570) (0.434)
Other controls N Y Y N Y N
Country-round fixed effects N N Y N N Y
Observations 101,317 101,317 101,317 217,864 217,864 217,864
Any state 0.16 0.14 0.05 -1.24 -0.21 0.01
(0.176) (0.099) (0.096) (0.835) (0.548) (0.391)
Other controls N Y Y N Y N
Country-round fixed effects N N Y N N Y
Observations 100,966 100,966 100,966 233,930 233,930 233,930
Usual polygyny 0.05 -0.01 -0.03 0.55 -0.21 0.00
(0.107) (0.057) (0.060) (0.665) (0.358) (0.246)
Other controls N Y Y N Y N
Country-round fixed effects N N Y N N Y
Observations 100,940 100,940 100,940 235,263 235,263 235,263
Notes: All regressions are OLS, with standard errors clustered by ethnic group reported in parentheses. Controls
are age, age squared, urban, and dummies for religion.
Table 7
Historic institutions and individual outcomes in sub-Saharan Africa (DHS Data)
Dep. var: Wealth index Dep. var: Years of education
